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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ORIGINALISM 
JAMAL GREENE∗
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Baze v. Rees, the Supreme Court rejected a death-row inmate’s 
claim that a state’s use of a lethal injection protocol that carried risks 
of severe pain from improper administration violated the Constitu-
tion.1  Justice Thomas wrote a remarkable concurring opinion, joined 
by Justice Scalia, in which he argued that the plurality opinion an-
nouncing the governing standard for claims of this sort was wrong, 
and should have hewed more closely to the original understanding of 
the Eighth Amendment.2  Justice Thomas wrote that “the Framers in-
tended to prohibit torturous modes of punishment akin to those that 
formed the historical backdrop of the Eighth Amendment,” referring 
to eighteenth-century practices such as burning a person alive, public 
dissection, and live disembowelment.3
Yet the Thomas concurrence merits our attention less for what it 
says than for what it does not say. Nowhere in the opinion does Justice 
Thomas refer to the Fourteenth Amendment.  This is so even though 
the Fourteenth Amendment was the constitutional provision under 
review in the case.
 
4
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  For Justice Thomas, as for many academic origi-
nalists, the Eighth Amendment applies to states only to the extent 
that relief from cruel and unusual punishments constituted a privi-
lege or immunity of citizenship at the time the Fourteenth Amend-
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versity of Texas School of Law, and the Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Originalism 
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Essay also benefited from workshops held at Brooklyn Law School, Columbia Law School, 
and Northwestern Law School, and from conversations with Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, John McGinnis, and Ilya Somin.  Melissa Lerner provided valuable 
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 1. 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Scalia joined Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence.  Id. 
 3. Id. at 94–97. 
 4. Id. at 47 (majority opinion) (noting that the Eighth Amendment was incorporated 
against the states in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962)). 
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ment was ratified.5
The Fourteenth Amendment is the Mr. Cellophane of originalist 
writing.  Judges, scholars, and ordinary citizens writing or speaking in 
the originalist tradition consistently ignore the original understand-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment even when that understanding 
should, on originalist principles, control the outcome of a case.  An 
originalist who believes that the Fourteenth Amendment incorpo-
rated against state governments some or all of the rights protected by 
the Bill of Rights should, in adjudicating cases under incorporated 
provisions, be concerned primarily (if not exclusively) with determin-
ing how the generation that ratified that amendment understood the 
scope and substance of the rights at issue.  An originalist who believes 
the Constitution is “colorblind” should seek justification for that view 
not in general considerations of policy or fairness, but in the original 
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause.  An originalist seeking 
to calibrate the constitutional division of authority and responsibility 
between states and the national government should engage with (or 
expressly disclaim) changes to that division brought about by the Re-
construction Amendments generally and by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in particular.  With limited exceptions,
  Failing to mention or to offer any explicit analysis 
of the governing constitutional text is not unusual in Supreme Court 
opinions, but it is a notable omission in an opinion in which the 
Court’s two most prominent originalists chide their colleagues for fail-
ing to heed constitutional text and history. 
6
 
 5. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3059 (2010) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 originalists do not en-
gage in these inquiries, tending instead to focus intently on the 
writings and utterances of the eighteenth-century constitutional draf-
ters.  Indeed, the biographies and intentions of men like John Bing-
 6. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
215–30 (1998); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 
1385, 1387–88 (1992); Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
447, 447–48 (2009) [hereinafter Lash, Beyond Incorporation]; Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adop-
tion of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 
1087–88 (1995) [hereinafter Lash, Establishment Clause]; Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption 
of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1106, 1109 (1994) [hereinafter Lash, Free Exercise]; see also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, 
FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE” 357–83 (2000) (exploring Reconstruc-
tion-era conceptions of free speech); Gary C. Leedes, Rediscovering the Link Between the Es-
tablishment Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Citizenship Declaration, 26 IND. L. REV. 
469, 469 (1993) (proposing that the Establishment Clause be read through the lens of 
equal citizenship as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Nicholas Quinn Rosen-
kranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1059–61 (2011) (arguing that 
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment applies the First Amendment to a broader 
range of state acts than the First Amendment itself applies to federal acts). 
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ham and Jacob Howard, drafters of the most important rights-related 
language in the Constitution, remain unknown even to constitutional 
lawyers and academics, to say nothing of the average Tea Partier. 
I note this tension not to create a “Gotcha!” moment for oppo-
nents of originalism—there are quite enough of those—but to report 
a phenomenon in need of explanation.  It is true, of course, that 
many originalists are simply Saturday sinners, inconsistent in their de-
votion when it leads to outcomes that are not congenial to their polit-
ical preferences or cultural values.  This is not a flattering charge, but 
it is not unique to originalists, nor does it necessarily reflect willful 
hypocrisy so much as cognitive dissonance.  Inconsistency in applica-
tion of one’s preferred constitutional interpretive methodology is a 
function of the human condition, and its mere existence is barely in-
teresting.   A consistent pattern of inconsistency does, however, lead 
one to wonder whether originalists in practice are faithful to a cohe-
rent set of commitments that originalism in theory simply does not 
recognize.  
The explanations this Essay proposes emerge in part from famili-
ar places and in part from less familiar ones.  Prominent originalists, 
Justice Scalia most famously, have conceded the need for originalism 
to negotiate important nonoriginalist precedents and cultural as-
sumptions if its proponents are to remain relevant.7
The missing, and less familiar, proposition I wish to advance is 
that originalism in practice is not just a method of interpretation, but 
rather—and most persuasively—a normative claim on American iden-
tity; it is most compelling as an ethical rather than hermeneutic exer-
cise.  And for several related reasons, originalists’ ethical compass in-
frequently points toward the Reconstruction Era or the political work 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters. 
  Respect for stare 
decisis may in some cases rationalize the gaps in originalist analysis of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  This may be particularly so in the case 
of incorporated rights.  But stare decisis is only part of the story and, I 
will argue, a relatively small part.   
First, the Fourteenth Amendment was a failure in its time.  Akhil 
Amar has emphasized that the original Constitution “was not merely a 
text but a deed—a constituting.”8
 
 7. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989). 
  The Fourteenth Amendment was 
designed, among other things, to “protect[] the black man in his fun-
damental rights as a citizen with the same shield which it throws over 
 8. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (2005). 
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the white man,”9
Second, across a number of domains the Fourteenth Amend-
ment presupposes and reinforces a commitment to pluralism rather 
than assimilation, and originalists tend to find comfort in determina-
cy.  Redemptive constitutionalism is attractive precisely because and 
to the degree that it refuses to bind modern interpretation to deci-
sions already made, avenues already blocked, and minds already 
closed.  Originalism is attractive precisely because and to the degree 
that it binds interpretation to a fixed and knowable set of meanings, 
so as to impede the indeterminacy and opportunity associated with 
open-textured constitutional construction.  It is no wonder that op-
ponents of moral relativism tend disproportionately to support origi-
nalism, or that African Americans tend overwhelmingly not to support 
it.
 but to the degree its central work has been accom-
plished, much later generations are responsible.  The Amendment’s 
inertia underwrites at least two expressive features of Fourteenth 
Amendment originalism that make it normatively unattractive to most 
professed originalists.  For one thing, the Fourteenth Amendment is a 
significant resource in narratives of constitutional redemption, but a 
weak resource in narratives of constitutional restoration.  A narrative 
of restoration urges us to adopt the values of the past because the past 
was a better time and, therefore, has a stronger normative claim on 
American identity.  But a constitutional argument taking the form of 
an ethical claim about American identity makes productive use of the 
Fourteenth Amendment only if the claim sounds in a redemptive reg-
ister—the Amendment announces majestic principles that we must 
constantly strive, prospectively, to realize.  Those who believe such 
principles to be central to constitutional interpretation neither need 
nor tend to use originalism as a justificatory framework.  Also, the 
failure of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters to accomplish their 
ends during their lifetimes denies to them the heroic status enjoyed 
by Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, and Washington.  That heroic status 
is essential to using appeals to history as persuasive authority in mod-
ern constitutional argument. 
10
Third, the Reconstruction Era is painful and embarrassing to—
and therefore best forgotten by—many of those whose cultural and 
  And it is no wonder that an amendment committing the Nation 
in the broadest of terms to an ambiguous set of ends is an unlikely re-
source in originalist arguments.  
 
 9. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2763 (1866) (Sen. Howard). 
 10. A recent survey found that only 4 percent of African Americans identified as origi-
nalists.  See Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 406 tbl. 9d (2011). 
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political commitments lead them to originalism.  The promise of Re-
construction is not just, in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s memorable 
words, a “bad check.”11
These rationales do not suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment 
somehow falls outside originalists’ formal rules of engagement but ra-
ther that, in practice, it is not a part (or is only a small part) of persu-
asive originalist forms of argumentation.  That being so, the project of 
reforming originalism to reflect the full impact of the Fourteenth 
Amendment on constitutional law is likely to resonate with a very li-
mited audience.  
  It is also a symbol of two-thirds of the coun-
try’s conquest over and occupation of the other third.  While the 
American Revolution remains a powerful expression of unification 
enabling and enabled by defeat of a common external enemy, the 
Civil War is just that, and victory in one part of the country necessarily 
meant defeat in the other.  This obvious difference should, in prin-
ciple, have no effect on constitutional interpretation generally or on 
the mechanics of originalism in particular, but it is likely to diminish 
the role of the Reconstruction Era within a persuasive account of 
American ethos.  It is particularly likely to have this effect among sou-
therners or among those who sympathize with either the state-
centered or the white-supremacist political project the Confederate 
states were defending. 
I.   
This Essay’s premise—that originalists devote insufficient atten-
tion to the Fourteenth Amendment—will seem obvious to some, but 
it is sure to baffle others.  There is, after all, a voluminous academic 
literature on the drafting history of the Fourteenth Amendment, on 
the specific intentions of its authors and of the members of the Thir-
ty-ninth Congress, and on the purposes behind its broad provisions.  
The original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause regarding 
racial segregation was debated extensively in the briefing to Brown v. 
Board of Education12 and has been a central concern of constitutional 
historians and theorists ever since.13
 
 11. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech Delivered at the Lincoln Memori-
al (Aug. 28, 1963), available at www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/martin-luther-kings=speech-
dream-full-text/story?id=14358231.   
  Studies of the scope of incorpo-
 12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 13. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 76 (1990); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation 
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1, 4–6 (1955); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and 
Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1881–82 (1995); 
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ration attending intimately to the legislative debate surrounding the 
Fourteenth Amendment have appeared in well-known Court opi-
nions14 and in canonical academic works.15  The recent case of McDo-
nald v. City of Chicago, in which the Court found that the individual 
right to possess a loaded handgun at home extends to state and local 
infringements, featured extensive briefing addressing the original 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters as to gun 
rights, and led to dueling opinions discussing and dissecting those 
historical arguments.16  Justice Scalia’s dismissive remark at oral ar-
gument in McDonald that grounding incorporation in the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause was the “darling of the professoriate” may sug-
gest rather too much attention to the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, not too little.17
Some clarification of the argument, then, is in order. Originalist 
neglect of the Fourteenth Amendment is selective rather than gener-
al.  The debate over whether the Amendment was intended to incor-
porate some or all of the Bill of Rights continues to be waged among 
originalists,
 
18
 
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 952–
53 (1995). 
 but it is not accompanied by a similarly spirited debate 
over the degree to which any particular right in the Bill of Rights was 
understood by the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters and ratifiers as 
it was understood in 1791.  To take our earlier example, suppose that 
Justice Thomas is correct that the Eighth Amendment was not origi-
nally understood to forbid a particular method of punishment solely 
based on an unintended risk of significant pain.  Suppose further that 
those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment believed that the 
Eighth Amendment in fact erected a constitutional prohibition 
against such a method of punishment.  In a case in which the alleged 
infringer is a state or local rather than a federal actor, it is difficult to 
understand a top-down theory of interpretation under which the first 
 14. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 
68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 15. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
181–87 (1998); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 155–89 (1997); CHARLES FAIRMAN & STANLEY MORRISON, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY (1970). 
 16. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3048–50 (2010). Id. at 3086 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 3112 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 3130–36 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 17. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 
(2010) (No 08-1521). 
 18. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3089 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting sources). 
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view would control over the second.  Indeed, for an originalist who 
believes Barron v. Baltimore19
And yet, interpreting incorporated rights as if they were original 
rights is very much the norm among both originalists and nonorigi-
nalists.  Examples abound in both judicial opinions and scholarship. 
Take Justice Black’s opinion in Everson v. Board of Education
 was correctly decided, it is difficult to un-
derstand why the original understanding of the Bill of Rights ever 
should, in itself, control a constitutional case involving state and local 
action. 
20 discuss-
ing James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance21 as informing the cor-
rect interpretation of the Establishment Clause.22  Or Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Crawford v. Washington,23 which lavishes attention upon the 
common-law background of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause but pays hardly any mind to the antebellum understanding of 
the right.24  Consider originalist scholar Michael McConnell’s exhaus-
tive excavation of the eighteenth-century Framers’ understanding of 
the scope of constitutionally required religious accommodation.25
The position that only eighteenth-century views are relevant to 
the original meaning of the incorporated Bill of Rights is difficult to 
defend, but it is not impossible to articulate.  Someone could arrive at 
this position by arguing that all the Fourteenth Amendment genera-
tion did with respect to the Bill of Rights was to apply its first eight 
  
Once one begins to look for instances of originalists overlooking the 
influence of Reconstruction-era thought on the meaning of rights 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, such instances appear 
ubiquitous. 
 
 19. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights does not apply to state 
governments). 
 20. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 21. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 
VOL. II 1783–1787, at 183–91 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).   
 22.  Everson, 330 U.S. at 12.  In Lynch v. Donnelly, which upheld a crèche display, Justice 
Brennan wrote in his dissenting opinion that “[t]he intent of the Framers with respect to 
the public display of nativity scenes is virtually impossible to discern primarily because the 
widespread celebration of Christmas did not emerge in its present form until well into the 
19th century.” 465 U.S. 668, 720 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Of course, the relevant 
framers should be the Fourteenth Amendment framers. 
 23. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 24. Id. at 42–50. 
 25. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Re-
ligion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1413–15 (1990).  As Kurt Lash has written, the view that the 
Free Exercise Clause requires religious exemptions from neutral laws of general applicabil-
ity is more plausibly attributed to the Reconstruction Republicans, who were familiar with 
slave-state literacy laws that prevented Bible reading, than to the eighteenth-century Fra-
mers.  Lash, Free Exercise, supra note 6, at 1109–10. 
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amendments, as originally understood, to state infringements.  This is 
not, however, a plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, nor have I ever seen it articulated explicitly by any modern ori-
ginalist.  There is, first, a conceptual difficulty in proceeding in this 
way.  As Barron makes clear, the ratifying generation for the Bill of 
Rights conceptualized the document through a federalism lens. From 
this vantage, one’s belief as to the scope of a right is quite unlikely to 
be indifferent to whether the right is asserted against the centralized 
federal government or against a state or local actor.  The difficulty is 
most clear with respect to those rights that may have been originally 
understood as purely or mostly structural, such as the Establishment 
Clause or the Second Amendment, but it remains problematic even 
for those rights that plainly implicate individual freedoms.  The fact 
that the federal government is one of enumerated powers might, for 
example, reasonably influence the sorts of regulatory practices that 
qualify as takings under the Fifth Amendment. 
Even apart from this conceptual difficulty, there remains the 
problem of whose view of the Bill of Rights’ original understanding is 
the one that controls—that of the modern judge or that of the Four-
teenth Amendment ratifying generation.  That generation, broken 
and battered by a war that may have been precipitated in part by the 
Dred Scott decision, did not trust federal judges.26  Nor did those Amer-
icans have the same regard many modern Americans do for the con-
stitutional Framers—William Lloyd Garrison, who called the Constitu-
tion “a covenant with death and an agreement with hell,” was invited 
to raise the federal flag at Fort Sumter at the conclusion of the Civil 
War.27
It is necessary to qualify my skepticism somewhat because one 
can in fact imagine a kind of fainthearted originalism that leads to the 
result criticized above. Consider Justice Scalia, who originated the 
  It is unthinkable that that generation believed itself to be de-
legating interpretation of the Bill of Rights, as applied to states, to 
federal judges to determine how eighteenth-century Americans would 
have understood its protections (which did not at the time apply to 
states).  If this is the view that any originalist holds, I should like to 
hear him advance it. 
 
 26. See Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against 
Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1356 & n. 18 (1964) (“[T]he framers and backers of the 
fourteenth amendment were primarily interested in enlarging the powers of the Congress, 
not those of the federal judiciary, which was looked upon with considerable distrust”). 
 27. See Merton L. Dillon, The Failure of the American Abolitionists, 25 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 
159, 159 (1959). 
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“fainthearted” label to describe his own views in 1989.28  Justice Scalia 
has accepted certain aspects of the Court’s incorporation jurispru-
dence as settled law.29  Even though he criticizes substantive due 
process at every available opportunity,30 he is unwilling to reconsider 
whether incorporation—a form of substantive due process—is consti-
tutionally legitimate or whether it might more faithfully be accom-
plished via a different doctrinal avenue.31
There are at least three levels of generality at which we might ad-
judicate the meaning of an incorporated right as applied to a state or 
local actor.  At the highest level of generality, we might consider 
whether the entire corpus of rights protected against federal in-
fringement in the Bill of Rights is also protected in exactly the same 
way against state infringement.  At a medium level of generality, we 
might consider whether some rights but not others are protected in 
exactly the same way against state as against federal infringement.  At 
a low level of generality, we might consider the degree to which the 
scope and substance of rights protection is the same in the states ver-
sus in the federal context. Broadly speaking, the Court has debated 
whether to proceed at a high versus medium level of generality, and 
has settled on the medium level: total incorporation has lost and se-
lective incorporation (at a markedly low threshold) has won.
   
32  With 
notable and criticized exceptions,33
 
 28. Scalia, supra note 
 the Court has focused little on the 
7, at 864. 
 29. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 
(2010) (No. 08-1521).  
 30. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587–92 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cri-
ticizing the majority’s decision to use substantive due process grounds to overrule earlier 
precedent). 
 31. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Despite my misgivings about 
Substantive Due Process as an original matter, I have acquiesced in the Court’s incorpora-
tion of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights ‘because it is both long established and nar-
rowly limited.’  This case does not require me to reconsider that view, since straightfor-
ward application of settled doctrine suffices to decide it.” (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 
U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring))). 
 32. Compare, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–49 (1968) (noting that only 
some rights protected from federal infringement by the Bill or Rights are applicable to the 
states), with id. at 163 (Black, J., concurring) (suggesting that the entire Bill of Rights was 
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 33. E.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366–67 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the incorporated Sixth Amendment, unlike the original, does not require 
jury unanimity in criminal cases); cf. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1964) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (“I do not understand . . . how [interpreting the Due Process Clause] can be 
short-circuited by the simple device of incorporating into due process, without critical ex-
amination, the whole body of law which surrounds a specific prohibition directed against 
the Federal Government. The consequence of such an approach . . . is inevitably disregard 
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choice between a medium or low level of generality; that is, the Court 
has not much debated the degree to which incorporated rights 
should have precisely the same content at the state level versus the 
federal level.  For most incorporated rights, the Court made no dis-
tinction at the time of incorporation and has made no distinction in 
subsequent cases.34
Now return to our fainthearted originalist.  He might believe that 
both the triumph of selective incorporation and the rejection of indi-
vidualized consideration of the difference between state and federal 
rights are settled, but that the meaning of particular federal rights is 
not settled.  Justice Scalia appears to fit this description: he rejects the 
Court’s evolving standards jurisprudence in considering the meaning 
of the Eighth Amendment but he accepts that the Eighth Amend-
ment is incorporated and that its meaning is identical whether ap-
plied to state or to federal action.  He refuses, on originalist grounds, 
to accept that firing (or refusing to hire) a civil servant or a public 
contractor based on political ideology violates the First Amendment, 
but he has never, to my knowledge, suggested that the rule should be 
different as between state and federal employers.
 
35
There is reason to doubt, however, that this degree of fainthear-
tedness is a considered choice on the part of most originalists.  First, 
and perhaps most significantly, I have never seen the just-described 
argument articulated in any writing, originalist or not. It is generally 
just assumed without discussion that originalism requires that the 
original understanding of federal rights determine the meaning of 
incorporated rights.  Second, many originalists, including Justice 
Thomas, clearly are not fainthearted in this way, and nonetheless 
  It may be that 
many originalists are fainthearted in just this way, and so have little 
reason to consider the original understanding of particular privileges 
or immunities of citizenship.  The McDonald majority’s extensive dis-
cussion of Reconstruction-era views on gun rights may lend faint sup-
port to this possibility: by suggesting that the Second Amendment 
might protect a right against federal but not state infringements, the 
McDonald dissenters unsettled the otherwise settled rejection of di-
vided incorporation. 
 
of all relevant differences which may exist between state and federal criminal law and its 
enforcement.”).  
 34. See Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2005). 
 35. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
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make the same choices as to interpretation of incorporated rights.36
There are, moreover, other ways in which originalists conspi-
cuously neglect the Fourteenth Amendment.  Many, for example, are 
famously uninterested in the original understanding of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause regarding race-conscious government action.  The 
Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment also enacted race-
conscious measures designed to ameliorate the condition of former 
slaves.
  
Third, unmooring the practice of originalism from an inquiry into the 
meaning of a politically significant text deprives the theory of its usual 
normative justifications.  At no point in our constitutional history did 
any democratically responsible institution determine and embody 
within a text the notion that state and local actors should be bound by 
Justice Scalia’s considered view of the eighteenth-century meaning of 
the Bill of Rights.  If his view as to the eighteenth-century meaning of 
a particular right happens to approximate the view as to its 1868 
meaning held by the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is only 
through happenstance.  And so it is not that the originalist inquiry as 
it is usually conducted is helpful but insufficient to decide cases in-
volving incorporated rights; it is that the inquiry is simply the wrong 
one. There is little reason, in principle, for an originalist to privilege 
the meaning of an incorporated right circa 1791 over its meaning in 
any other year prior to 1868.  
37  It is reasonable to suppose that an originalist would not, 
then, take issue with contemporary affirmative action plans aimed at 
inclusion rather than exclusion of racial minorities.  But many origi-
nalists, including Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, object to such 
plans on the ground that the Equal Protection Clause requires both 
states and the federal government to be colorblind.38
 
 36. See Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 727, 742–43 (2009) (chiding Justice Thomas for ignoring the implications of Recon-
struction for the meaning of the Establishment Clause).  As for McDonald, it remains to be 
seen whether future Courts inclined toward Second Amendment originalism will turn to 
the Fourteenth Amendment ratifiers for guidance as to the scope of the protected right 
and not merely the fact of its incorporation. 
  To my know-
ledge, neither Justice has ever sought in writing to justify that reading 
in originalist terms (nor, incidentally, has either Justice justified ap-
 37. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427 (1997) (stating that the 
1860s Congress repeatedly enacted statutes granting benefits to freedmen on the basis of 
race); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754–55 (1985) (describing Reconstruction-era legislative efforts to 
help freedmen).  
 38. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520–21 
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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plication of the Equal Protection Clause to the federal government in 
such terms).39
Another area of conspicuous inattention to the Fourteenth 
Amendment is federalism.  Many originalists reject Justice Miller’s 
view (or rather, the received wisdom as to his view) in the Slaughter-
House Cases that the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not incor-
porate the Bill of Rights against the states.
 
40  The more celebrated dis-
senting opinions of Justice Field and Justice Bradley both emphasize, 
not unreasonably, that the Reconstruction Amendments were de-
signed to effect a radical transformation in the division of authority 
and responsibility between states and the federal government.41  It 
does not take much examination of the legislative history behind the 
Fourteenth Amendment—and the repeated invocations therein of 
Justice Washington’s illustrative enumeration of privileges and im-
munities in Corfield v. Coryell42—to conclude that many of those re-
sponsible for the Amendment’s codification believed that it empo-
wered the federal government to guard against state infringement of 
a wide array of rights both encompassing and extending well beyond 
those enumerated in the Bill of Rights.43
 
 39. Justice Thomas has, in passing, suggested that race-conscious measures enacted 
during Reconstruction are consistent with a colorblind Constitution insofar as they were 
designed as remedies for past “state-sponsored discrimination.”  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 
at 772 n.19 (Thomas, J., concurring).  This is not, of course, the same as affirmatively de-
fending the colorblind view but it is something of a start.  It is not clear from Justice Tho-
mas’s brief discussion how the numerous Reconstruction-era statutes appropriating money 
to destitute “colored” persons were narrowly tailored remedial measures.  See Rubenfeld, 
supra note 
  Yet it remains that in both 
scholarship and in Court opinions, the texts most consistently used to 
37, at 430–31 (describing such statutes).  The most thoughtful originalist justifi-
cation for a constitutional prohibition on affirmative action is offered by John Harrison, 
who has argued that much of what passes today for equal-protection jurisprudence is more 
appropriately adjudicated under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which protects 
against racial discrimination in positive-law rights of state citizenship.  Harrison, supra note 
6, at 1388–89.  The legality of a particular instance of affirmative action would then de-
pend on the nature of the deprivation at issue.  Id. at 1463–64.  This is not a “colorblind” 
view as usually understood and, in any event, is a self-consciously limited treatment of af-
firmative action from an originalist perspective.  See id. at 1462–64. 
 40. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1872).  In my view, Justice Mil-
ler’s majority opinion does not support the anti-incorporation view (which would, in any 
event, be dicta), but Justice Miller later joined Chief Justice Waite’s opinion in United States 
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876), which unambiguously rejected incorporation.  
 41. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 93 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111 (Bradley, J., dis-
senting). 
 42. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
 43. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 30 
(1980) (describing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
“a delegation to future constitutional decision-makers to protect rights that are not listed 
either in the Fourteenth Amendment or elsewhere in the document”). 
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reveal original understandings on federalism issues are the Federalist 
Papers;44
Members of the Court have on occasion engaged the history of 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in cases in which the scope 
of that provision was directly at issue.  For example, Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion for the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores turned to the drafting 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment to aid in his conclusion that 
the section’s purpose was “remedial” rather than substantive.
 we see no effort to identify or celebrate the canonical fede-
ralism-related documents of the Reconstruction Era. 
45  But 
even in cases in which Section 5 is the very provision under review, 
careful attention to original understanding is the exception rather 
than the rule.  Thus, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, when then-Justice Rehn-
quist wrote for the Court upholding the power of Congress to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity via Section 5, his opinion was deeply 
doctrinal in nature, referring only indirectly to the original under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment.46  And in United States v. Mor-
rison, in disclaiming application of Section 5 to an asserted pattern of 
state judicial underenforcement of cases involving gender-motivated 
violence, Rehnquist, as Chief Justice, relied on, in part, nineteenth-
century cases expounding federal judges’ views of Reconstruction 
power, without addressing the intentions or understandings of rele-
vant members of Congress or the public at large.47  Indeed, he wrote 
that viewing Section 5 as limited was “necessary to prevent the Four-
teenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers’ carefully crafted 
balance of power between the States and the National Government.”48
Simply to assert the need to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment 
from too radically altering the federal-state balance begs the question.  
An originalism sensitive to the whole Constitution would confront 
openly the degree to which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed 
to affect that balance, and not just in cases directly implicating Sec-
tion 5.  In cases like Fitzpatrick and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
 
49
 
 44. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 914–15 (1997) (examining The Fede-
ralist Papers to decide whether the federal government may require state officials to ex-
ecute federal laws); see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 39 (James Madison), NO. 32 
(Alexander Hamilton). 
 
the Court treated the Fourteenth Amendment as an addendum ra-
ther than as an amendment.  In the latter case, in which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist debated Justice Souter at great length over the extent to 
 45. 521 U.S. 507, 509, 520–24 (1997). 
 46. 427 U.S. 445, 446, 453–56 (1976). 
 47. 529 U.S. 598, 620–27 (2000). 
 48. Id. at 620. 
 49. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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which the eighteenth-century Framers would have intended Congress 
to be able to abrogate state sovereign immunity via its Article I pow-
ers,50 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “Fitzpatrick cannot be read to 
justify ‘limitation of the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amend-
ment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution.’”51  
Chief Justice Rehnquist was quoting Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion 
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., which (like Justice Scalia’s opinions 
addressing incorporated rights) treats the Constitution as a linear se-
ries of provisions whose interpretation sheds no light on other provi-
sions not specifically mentioned.52  As Charles Black writes, “in deal-
ing with questions of constitutional law, we have preferred the 
method of purported explication or exegesis of the particular textual 
passage considered as a directive of action, as opposed to the method 
of inference from the structures and relationships created by the con-
stitution in all its parts or in some principal part.”53
It takes some creativity to assert that the Fourteenth Amendment 
enlarges the scope of Congress’s Article I powers, and I do not mean 
to suggest that an originalist would necessarily be wrong to deny the 
assertion.  Consider, though, the following interpretation: Section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment provides the basis for an expansive de-
finition of national citizenship, and Section 5 permits enforcement of 
the Fourteenth Amendment “by appropriate legislation.”
 
54  We might 
interpret “appropriate legislation” as the City of Boerne Court did: as 
legislation that “enforces” judicially recognized rights.55  But we might 
also interpret it in less juriscentric terms, as legislation that enforces 
congressionally recognized rights.56
 
 50. Id. at 66–71 & n.11. 
  The work then done by the word 
“appropriate,” from the perspective of a reviewing court, would be to 
 51. Id. at 66 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (emphasis added). 
 52. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 41–42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 53. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 
(1969). 
 54. See Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated 
Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2001) (considering the argument that, if the 
Fourteenth Amendment modifies the Eleventh Amendment, then it also changes the 
scope of Congress’s Article I powers).   
 55. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (explaining that Congress’s 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to enforcing the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 56. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Pow-
er: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2022 
(2003) (arguing that there are “strong independent reasons for affirming Congress’s au-
thority to employ Section 5 power to enforce its own constitutional understandings”). 
 992 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:978 
preserve other limitations on Congress’s legislative power imposed by 
the Bill of Rights; the Necessary and Proper Clause; Article I, Section 
9; and the like.57  Whether or not one accepts this theory, it is reason-
able to expect originalists to incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment 
into extant accounts of federalism.  If one of the original impulses 
behind federalism was to ensure that “the society itself will be broken 
into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that rights of indi-
viduals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested 
combinations of the majority,”58
It bears mention that selective neglect of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is not limited to law professors and judges, though we 
need not dwell long on the point.  I regard it as nearly axiomatic that, 
outside of courts and academic halls, most participants in public dis-
course who exalt originalism fail almost entirely to discuss the Four-
teenth Amendment.  In his book Liberty and Tyranny, Mark Levin, a 
radio host and self-styled “constitutional expert” writes, “For much of 
American history, the balance between governmental authority and 
individual liberty was understood and accepted. . . .  But in the 1930s, 
during the Great Depression, the Statists successfully launched a 
counterrevolution that radically and fundamentally altered the nature 
of American society.”
 it would be useful to know whether 
and to what degree vastly expanding congressional and judicial power 
to preempt state exercises of the police power renders these impulses 
less intelligible. 
59
The Constitution’s ratification by the southern states would 
ultimately mark the beginning of the end of slavery—
coming to fruition with their defeat in the Civil War and the 
subsequent adoption by Congress and the states of the Thir-
teenth (formally abolishing slavery), Fourteenth (prohibit-
ing the abridgement of citizens’ rights), and Fifteenth (pro-
hibiting race as a bar to voting) Amendments to the 
Constitution.
  Within that ellipsis is no reference to slavery, 
the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment, or anything else that 
might plausibly have affected the balance between governmental au-
thority and individual liberty prior to the New Deal.  Levin does dis-
cuss slavery in the book, but he insists that:  
60
 
 57. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (“[T]he McCulloch v. Maryland 
standard is the measure of what constitutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”).  
 
 58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 59. MARK R. LEVIN, LIBERTY AND TYRANNY: A CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTO 5–6 (2009). 
 60. Id. at 58. 
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Levin’s narrative of continuity, in which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is cast as a seamless embodiment of foundational principles, is 
common among popular originalists.  W. Cleon Skousen’s The Five 
Thousand Year Leap, which has become a kind of sacred document 
among many Tea Partiers,61 was written “to catalogue the ingredients 
of the Founding Fathers’ phenomenal success,” but includes a single, 
cursory reference to the Fourteenth Amendment.62  Skousen’s chap-
ter on the principle that “All Men Are Created Equal” asserts, without 
referencing slavery, that “the Founders were able to establish a society 
of freedom and opportunity.”63  When Skousen does make a fleeting 
reference to slavery, it is in a portion of the chapter in which he says 
that “the blacks” soon thereafter began to receive advancement op-
portunities “which no doubt the Founders such as Washington, Jeffer-
son, and Franklin would have strongly approved.”64
Before turning to the reasons for originalists’ selective indiffe-
rence to the Fourteenth Amendment, it is worth pausing to consider 
the reasons for their selective cognizance.  As mentioned above, there 
are indeed Fourteenth Amendment-related areas—namely the origi-
nal understanding of the effect of the Equal Protection Clause on se-
gregated public institutions and the legitimacy of incorporation it-
self—in which originalists (as much as others) have long been deeply 
engaged in historical and doctrinal debate.
  Skousen does 
not, of course, mention that all three men were slaveholders.  
65
It will be profitable to reconsider this objection once we have ex-
amined more rigorously the potential reasons for originalists’ selec-
tive neglect.  For now, consider that the two areas in which originalists 
have most aggressively engaged the Fourteenth Amendment are areas 
in which nonengagement poses an existential threat to originalism.  
The most well-known originalist inquiries into the original under-
  Might it be then, that 
their relative inattention to other ways in which the Fourteenth 
Amendment might influence modern interpretation is simply an 
oversight, to be expected in a methodology that until recently was not 
advanced with the analytic sophistication many of its modern propo-
nents claim?  Might it be that I have indeed identified little more than 
a “Gotcha!” to be corrected when Originalism 3.0 hits the law reviews? 
 
 61. See Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular Originalism, 53 
ARIZ. L. REV. 827, 839 (2011) (characterizing Skousen’s books as “[t]he most popular 
sources about the Founders and the Constitution among Tea Party supporters”). 
 62. W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE FIVE THOUSAND YEAR LEAP 85 (rev. ed. 2009) (1981). 
 63. Id. at 81. 
 64. Id. at 83. 
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 12–18. 
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standing of the Equal Protection Clause with respect to school segre-
gation are in service of the view that originalism is not inconsistent 
with Brown and therefore irrelevant.  Originalist resuscitations of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause are necessary in order to prevent ori-
ginalism from condemning all applications of the Bill of Rights to the 
states.  Anyone who argues that the Bill of Rights should not apply to 
actions by state and local officials has thereby left the mainstream 
conversation about rights.  Continuing to refer to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s history in these contexts is, I will argue, entirely consis-
tent with the view that originalism owes both its legal and its broader 
cultural prominence less to any devotion to a consistent or even per-
suasive set of interpretive rules than to its role in advancing an in-
fluential normative argument about American identity. 
II.   
As Part I demonstrates, the curious gap between originalism in 
theory and originalism in practice regarding the role of the Four-
teenth Amendment is not solely a feature of popular commentary.  
Were it so, one might easily dismiss the divergence as deriving from a 
lack of sophistication about constitutional theory.  Just as participants 
in popular discourse continue to characterize originalism in terms of 
Framers’ intent66 even as many academics have shifted to original 
meaning,67 we might suppose that misunderstanding the mechanics 
of incorporation or the original imperatives of the Equal Protection 
Clause results from little more than an unwillingness or an inability to 
understand what it means to practice the theory of originalism.  We 
might assume, in other words, that the practice is coarse even as (and 
perhaps in part because) the theory is rich and complex.  But when 
many of the most thoughtful and influential practitioners and expli-
cators of a theory appear to be getting the theory wrong in practice, 
we must consider the possibility that the theory is less interesting than 
the practice, or rather that the theory of interest is simply not what its 
practitioners say it is.  Maybe, in other words, Levin has it about 
right.68
This Part suggests reasons why originalists systematically underva-
lue the Fourteenth Amendment. These reasons are not derived from 
 
 
 66. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
 67. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 
248–49 (2009) (describing the shift among originalists from focusing on original intent to 
deciphering original meaning). 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. 
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any extant theory of originalist interpretation; as I have argued, origi-
nalism in theory does not permit this undervaluation.  Nor are these 
reasons derived wholly from cultural profiling, even as they draw from 
research that fits within anthropological methods.69
Any competent taxonomist of constitutional argument must in-
clude history among the resources to be deployed, and indeed the 
most influential taxonomists—Philip Bobbitt and Richard Fallon—
appear to give historical arguments a prominent place in their ac-
counts.
  Rather, the rea-
sons emerge in large measure from an assessment of the work consti-
tutional history actually does in constitutional argument.  This is law-
yers’ business, inasmuch as lawyers, in excavating and describing the 
architecture of legal analysis, are anthropologists within their domain. 
70  But we must be careful to distinguish, as historians are so 
often eager, how historians and constitutional lawyers use history.  
“[H]istorians[,]” Jack Rakove writes, “have little stake in ascertaining 
the original meaning of a clause for its own sake, or in attempting to 
freeze or distill its true, unadulterated meaning at some pristine mo-
ment of constitutional understanding.”71  By contrast, originalists are 
interested in using history as a form of normative democratic authori-
ty, and so the search for a single, identifiable original meaning of or 
intention behind a constitutional provision has high stakes indeed; 
the stakes increase, moreover, in proportion to the quality or narra-
tive purchase (within the legal community) of the authority invoked.  
While, as Rakove writes, historians may “rest content with—even revel 
in—the ambiguities of the evidentiary record,”72
 
 69. See Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, supra note 
 ambiguity is a poten-
tially fatal threat to the originalist’s enterprise.  It would be odd, given 
these constraints, if originalists regarded all equally accessible sources 
of meaning as equally useful to their analysis.  We should instead, and 
appropriately, expect a vigorous contest over the meaning of particu-
lar high-reward forms of authority and relative indifference to low-
reward (even if, at times, less ambiguous) forms of authority.  
10, at 408–10. 
 70. Bobbitt discusses historical argument first in both of his books on constitutional 
interpretation, although he resists any explicit hierarchy.  See PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982); PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991).  Historical argument sits second (follow-
ing text) in Fallon’s five-tiered hierarchy of constitutional argument.  See Richard H. Fal-
lon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1189, 1243–46 (1987) (placing historical intent arguments above arguments based on 
theory, precedent, and value). 
 71. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 9 (1997). 
 72. Id. 
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We should expect such a contest even among those legal aca-
demics who are fluent in historical methods (just as we should expect 
it among those bona fide historians who are attuned to the conse-
quences of their work for resolution of political and legal debate).73  
So long as the enterprise aims to endow a set of historical materials 
with normative authority, it necessarily must negotiate among the dis-
parate demands of accuracy and ethos.  A careful scholar must docu-
ment the complexity of the historical record, but a legal advocate 
must emphasize sources of authority with purchase within the com-
munity of constitutional lawyers.  He cannot be all sabermetrician; he 
must win games and sell tickets.  For a judge, who is unlikely to be an 
able historian and whose peer group does not demand the compe-
tence norms of professional academics, we should expect conclusions 
as to original meaning to be even more heavily leveraged by the need 
for certainty and the burdens of ethical argument.74  As Robert Cover 
said, “We view the acts of history as authoritative precisely because we 
read into that history that part of the past which we choose to make 
authoritative, which we wish to emulate.”75  To this the historian Lau-
ra Kalman replies, “I doubt any historian considers the past authorita-
tive.”76
The features of history that endow it with authority in constitu-
tional argument cannot be adduced through historical methods and 
need not align with historians’ assessments of value.
 
77  The statement 
that the Establishment Clause means X because Madison had X in 
mind when he wrote his Memorial and Remonstrance derives from an 
account of authority, not of history.  And the reasons why Madison’s 
actions and beliefs wield authority within arguments about the mean-
ing of the religion clauses need not relate to Madison’s particular re-
lationship to the First Amendment.78
 
 73. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 169 (1998) (cau-
tioning not to maintain a fastidious segregation between “lawyers’ legal history” and “his-
torians’ legal history”). 
  Madison’s identity as a principal 
drafter of other constitutional provisions, his co-authorship of the Fe-
 74. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 661 (1987). 
 75. Tanina Rostain, Tributes to Robert M. Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1713, 1715 (1987). 
 76. KALMAN, supra note 73, at 180. 
 77. See Powell, supra note 74, at 662–64 (arguing that “[h]istory itself will not prove an-
ything nonhistorical,” including whether the originalist approach is appropriate to consti-
tutional practice).  
 78. Indeed, the most obvious means by which one might leverage that relationship in-
to a claim of authority—by noting that Madison drafted the Establishment Clause—is a 
means expressly disclaimed by many academic originalists.  See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacri-
fice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 720–21 (2011) (explaining the shift among 
many originalists from original intent theories to original meaning theories). 
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deralist Papers, his service to the country as its fourth President and as 
Commander in Chief during the War of 1812, and his role in contest-
ing the Alien and Sedition Acts all contribute to the argument that we 
should permit his legacy to direct modern interpretation.  And yet, 
none of those aspects of Madison’s biography are relevant to assessing 
the contemporaneous meaning of the Memorial and Remonstrance or 
even Madison’s intentions in drafting the Establishment Clause.  
For history to count as authoritative it must be prescriptive and it 
must be culturally resonant, but it need not, in effect, count as histo-
ry.  It must be prescriptive because it has a resolutive function that has 
little to no use for ambiguity.  It must be culturally resonant because it 
is offered as a way out of the countermajoritarian difficulty: it is a 
means by which we locate our constitutive commitments in the past, 
and situate judges as faithful agents of those commitments.  It need 
not count as history because, as discussed above, the art of legal per-
suasion aligns imperfectly with the professional narration of history.   
Understanding the function of history in constitutional argu-
ment enables us to make better sense of originalists’ systematic neg-
lect of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The basic contention is that, on 
the criteria just mentioned, Reconstruction is less usable, less mobiliz-
able than the Founding Era for three broad reasons.  First, much of 
Reconstruction was a failure in its time.79  Second, the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not easily embody settled and unambiguous consti-
tutional propositions.80  Third, the Fourteenth Amendment occupies 
an awkward and contested space within our national memory.81
A.  Failure 
 
If antagonists and partisans of the Reconstruction South can 
agree on anything, it is that Reconstruction was a failure.  For decades 
scholars have debated the reasons for that failure, with the so-called 
Dunning School pinning it on the supposed incapacity of blacks to 
integrate into civil society,82
 
 79. See infra Part II.A. 
 and dissenters and later revisionists more 
inclined to blame southern recalcitrance in the form of the Compro-
 80. See infra Part II.B. 
 81. See infra Part II.C. 
 82. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–
1877, at xviii (2002) (writing that Dunning School scholars pushed the idea that “childlike 
blacks . . . were unprepared for freedom and incapable of properly exercising the political 
rights Northerners had thrust upon them”). 
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mise of 1877 and the Jim Crow era that followed.83  No one could dis-
pute, however, that the civil and political equality the Reconstruction 
Amendments sought to guarantee to free blacks would not come for 
another century or longer.  At the centennial of the Emancipation 
Proclamation in 1963, a black person in much of the South could not 
vote and was restricted in her choice of hotel, restaurant, water foun-
tain, bathroom, theater seat, and marriage partner.  Blacks remained, 
officially and literally, “regarded as beings of an inferior order, and 
altogether unfit to associate with the white race.”84
The failure of Reconstruction generally, and of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in particular, poses significant obstacles to the use of 
that Amendment’s original understanding as authority in modern 
cases.  I focus here on two in particular.  First, the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not figure prominently in narratives of constitu-
tional restoration.  Second, Reconstruction’s heroes sit outside the 
American pantheon.  
 
Contests over ethos conform to several dichotomies, what Jack 
Balkin might call “nested oppositions,”85 evident within U.S. constitu-
tional argument.  We debate whether our better nature is individualis-
tic or communitarian, assimilationist or pluralistic, anchored in the 
past or realized continuously and prospectively into the future.  The 
last of these dichotomies, which we may recharacterize as an opposi-
tion between narratives of restoration versus redemption, has long 
mapped onto the central divide between originalists and living consti-
tutionalists.  Those who affiliate with originalism tend to emphasize 
restorative narratives; those who affiliate with living constitutionalism 
tend to emphasize redemptive narratives.86
When we use history in constitutional argument, the sources we 
emphasize reinforce the orientation of the kind of narrative we wish 
to deploy.  Because the Fourteenth Amendment did not immediately 
achieve its ends—and in some ways has yet to do so—it is well-suited 
to redemptive narratives and ill-suited to restorative ones.  As Balkin 
 
 
 83. See john a. powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 L. & 
INEQ. 355, 376 (2007). 
 84. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). 
 85. J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1671 (1990) (reviewing JOHN M. 
ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION (1989)) (defining nested oppositions as those “which 
also involve a relation of dependence, similarity, or containment between the opposed 
concepts”). 
 86. Indeed, controlling for demographic variables, issue positions, and other ideologi-
cal variables, an individual’s relative level of moral traditionalism—her relative suspicion of 
“newer lifestyles” and embrace of tradition—is among the most robust predictors of her 
relative affinity for originalism.  Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, supra note 10, at 408–10. 
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writes, “Through constitutional redemption, the Constitution be-
comes what it always promised it would be but never was; it changes in 
the direction of its correct interpretation and application; it responds 
appropriately to alterations in time and circumstance.”87  Fidelity to 
the broad principles of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
not and cannot comfortably be framed as fidelity to the world the 
Fourteenth Amendment actually created; all participants in modern 
constitutional argument agree that that world was deeply inconsistent 
with the Amendment’s promise.  Robert Cover writes that 
“[r]edemption takes place within an eschatological schema that post-
ulates: (1) the unredeemed character of reality as we know it, (2) the 
fundamentally different reality that should take its place, and (3) the 
replacement of the one with the other.”88
A second obstacle to Fourteenth Amendment originalism that 
arises out of the failure of its drafters is, quite simply, that its drafters 
were failures.  Consider the dissenting opinion of then-Justice Rehn-
quist in Wallace v. Jaffree, in which the Court invalidated an Alabama 
statute that required a moment of silence for “meditation or voluntary 
prayer” in public schools.
  The unfortunate reality of 
Reconstruction means that in order to be a Fourteenth Amendment 
originalist, one must be telling a redemptive narrative.  But the more 
one focuses on redemption, the less one believes in originalism. 
89  The last piece of evidence Justice Rehn-
quist marshals in support of the view that the Establishment Clause 
was not originally understood to prohibit a legislature from encourag-
ing prayer is the fact that “George Washington himself . . . proclaimed 
a day of ‘public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowl-
edging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty 
God.’”90  Justice Rehnquist added the following coda: “History must 
judge whether it was the Father of his Country in 1789, or a majority 
of the Court today, which has strayed from the meaning of the Estab-
lishment Clause.”91
Justice Rehnquist’s invocation of Washington in this way is inter-
esting for several reasons.  First, like many originalist opinions already 
mentioned, it uses eighteenth-century history to yield the “true mean-
 
 
 87. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 6 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION]. 
 88. Robert M. Cover, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 
(1983). 
 89. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 90. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. 
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ing”92 of the Bill of Rights as applied to state practices—in this case 
endorsement of institutional prayer—without acknowledging the po-
tential relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment to the substantive in-
quiry.  Whether or not Washington or the Wallace majority strayed 
from the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, at a mini-
mum the Fourteenth Amendment strayed from that meaning, and yet 
it is treated as a technicality.93  Second, Washington is not invoked 
merely as an example of a reasonable contemporaneous reader of the 
Constitution.  His authority derives from, and is reinforced by, his sta-
tus as “Father of his Country.”94 The honorific is particularly apt here 
because Washington is the Nation’s father in multiple ways: the pre-
vailing general in its war for independence; the presiding officer at its 
constitutional convention; and its first President, responsible for 
countless decisions (including the decision to step down after two 
terms) that would set significant and ultimately constitutive prece-
dents.  Washington is the punctuation mark on Justice Rehnquist’s 
dissent because Washington is the Greatest American Hero.  Third, 
Justice Rehnquist contrasts Washington the hero with “a majority of 
the Court today.”95
It is impossible to imagine a judge using John Bingham in a simi-
lar way.  Bingham was a skilled orator, an outspoken abolitionist, a 
prosecutor of Lincoln’s assassins, and the most significant drafter of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, but as a descriptive matter, he is not a 
national hero.  In Cadiz, Ohio, where Bingham spent most of his life, 
the main road out of town once bore Bingham’s name, but it is now 
called East Market Street.  The local elementary school used to be 
called Bingham Grammar School, but is now called Harrison West-
gate Elementary School.  Efforts in recent years by the Harrison 
County (Ohio) Historical Society to have the U.S. Postal Service issue 
  The reference announces an affinity both with 
those who harbor an anti-elite bias and with those who are inclined to 
think it self-evident that Washington’s example must prevail over the 
views of “today.” 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 49 (majority opinion) (invoking the Fourteenth Amendment merely as a 
vehicle for incorporation). 
 94. It is a common nickname for Washington, and indeed has been used before in the 
Supreme Court.  Justice Frankfurter called Washington “the Father of his Country” in his 
concurring opinions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 614 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring), and United States v. Cong. of Indus. Organizations, 335 U.S. 106, 
124 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  The title has also been conferred on Cicero, Ju-
lius and Augustus Caesar, Andrea Do’rea, and Androni’cus Paleaol’ogus. E. COBHAM 
BREWER, BREWER’S DICTIONARY OF PHRASE & FABLE 411 (Ivor H. Evans ed., 14th ed. 1989).  
 95. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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a commemorative stamp in Bingham’s honor have been unsuccessful.  
The Wikipedia page for Mercer, Pennsylvania, where Bingham was 
born, does not mention the father of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but it notes that the town is the birthplace of “the 19th century pain-
ter Samuel Waugh, actor and impresario J C  Williamson[, and] Trent 
Reznor, creator of the band Nine Inch Nails.”96  There are many rea-
sons why Bingham is not memorialized,97
B.  Determinacy 
 some of which I discuss 
elsewhere in this section, but one of those reasons is surely that his 
singular accomplishment was a failure in his lifetime. 
The chief aim of much originalist constitutional interpretation is 
settlement.  H. Jefferson Powell writes that “[o]riginalism’s attractive-
ness, for the most part, lies in the possibility it seems to offer the judi-
cial interpreter of an escape from personal responsibility;”98 it is a 
delegation, that is, to a source of authority that is sufficiently objective 
to enable consensus around the answers to difficult constitutional 
questions.  The “great appeal” of originalism, Michael McConnell 
writes, is that it draws on “the foundational principles of the American 
Republic—principles we can all perceive for ourselves and that have 
shaped our Nation’s political character—and not the political-moral 
principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial office.”99
 
 96. Mercer, Pennsylvania, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercer,_Penn-
sylvania (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
  It is 
not that originalism must necessarily employ promising transparent—
 97. Bingham was demonized in the Fourteenth Amendment account of Charles Fair-
man, whose conclusion that incorporation was not intended had to confront Bingham’s 
explicit statements to the contrary.  See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment In-
corporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 135–37 (1949) (contextualizing Bingham’s 
statements regarding incorporation and arguing that the debates reflect a different under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment).  Pamela Brandwein writes that the “conceptual 
apparatus” that shaped the debate between Fairman and William Crosskey “linked the 
production of institutionally ‘credible’ representations of Fourteenth Amendment history 
to political distributions that were harmful to blacks.”  PAMELA BRANDWEIN, 
RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION 97 (1999).  Educated in the heyday of the Dunning 
School, Fairman called the Joint Committee on Reconstruction a “conspiracy,” and por-
trayed Bingham as unsophisticated and “confused” by Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in 
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).  Id. at 115–16.  Fairman was also a Harvard 
Law School professor during Justice Scalia’s matriculation. Without veering too far toward 
psychoanalysis, it seems reasonable to suppose that anyone persuaded to take a dim view of 
incorporation and of Bingham would be unlikely, in later life, to take incorporation se-
riously even after grudging acceptance. 
 98. Powell, supra note 74, at 659–60. 
 99. Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convic-
tions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, 
POLITICS, AND LAW (1988)). 
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and thereby debate-stifling—criteria of adjudication, but, as Powell 
and McConnell imply, disaggregating modern interpretation from 
modern thinking would be considerably less attractive without this 
feature.100
The Fourteenth Amendment tends away from settlement.  This is 
perhaps a partial restatement of the earlier claim that the Fourteenth 
Amendment better enables redemptive than restorative constitutional 
narratives, but the open-ended nature of Fourteenth Amendment in-
terpretation in no way depends on its historical failures.  The 
Amendment represents a commitment to a series of principles rather 
than rules or even standards, and principles often do not lend them-
selves to definitive application.  Balkin, defending the notion that liv-
ing constitutionalism is not inconsistent with constitutional fidelity, 
writes: 
 
The words “equal protection of the laws” mean pretty much 
the same as they did in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was adopted.  However, the best way to apply these 
words today may be very different from the way that the 
generation that adopted this text would have expected or 
even desired.101
Ronald Dworkin has long made a similar point, that the clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment “must be understood in the way their 
language most naturally suggests: they refer to abstract moral prin-
ciples and incorporate these by reference, as limits on government’s 
power.”
 
102  And, Dworkin continues, “Very different, even contrary, 
conceptions of a constitutional principle . . . will often fit language, 
precedent, and practice[,] . . .  and thoughtful judges must then de-
cide on their own which conception does most credit to the na-
tion.”103  The problem is that original understanding is ineffective as 
constitutional authority approximately to the degree that its yield may 
fairly be described as incommensurable visions of the good.104
 
 100. See Colby, supra note 
  Origi-
78, at 714–15. 
 101. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 87, at 231. 
 102. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 7 (1996). 
 103. Id. at 11. 
 104. In recent work, originalists John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport resist this claim, 
arguing that it rests on a “fallacy” that conflates abstract language with abstract meaning.  
See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, U. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1959668.  McGinnis and Rappaport observe, correctly, that a text may employ abstract 
language that would have been interpreted contemporaneously as having a well-known 
meaning.  See id. at 7.  This possibility speaks to the viability of a merger between original-
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nalists seek answers from the “Father of his Nation,” not from though-
tful judges. 
Originalism is most persuasive when it is, to borrow from Cover, 
“jurispathic.”105
C.  Memory 
  Cover worried that law may too easily be conceived 
narrowly as the search for the uniquely correct application of a norm.  
Rather, the law always states a concept of which there are multiple 
competing conceptions, distributed across diverse normative com-
munities.  If Balkin and Dworkin are correct, then the Fourteenth 
Amendment is fundamentally jurisgenerative: fidelity to the Amend-
ment precisely requires a judge to recognize the instability of legal 
norms over time and across communities.  This attribute endows the 
Fourteenth Amendment with a pluralistic character—the Nation’s 
marginalized persons may hold out hope of redeeming its offers of 
citizenship, of equality, of due process, without contesting the legiti-
macy of prevailing doctrine and without sacrificing fidelity to the Con-
stitution.  By contrast, originalism in its jurispathic form denies not 
just the normative correctness but the very legitimacy of alternative 
readings of the text.  Its aim is to assimilate competing normative vi-
sions into a single descriptive reality.  To apply effectively to the Four-
teenth Amendment, this form of originalism must deny the Amend-
ment’s basic character. 
The Iraqi scholar Kanan Makiya has observed that 
“[r]emembering is a choice we make . . . , a political act.”106
 
ism and living constitutionalism, but it does nothing to diminish the observation that 
broad language is susceptible to competing and incompatible applications even if its se-
mantic meaning is well understood. 
  The cul-
tural and historical treatment of Bingham is perhaps a testament to 
the truth of the observation.  The contours of American memories of 
the Civil War and of Reconstruction have long been shaped both by 
the need of southerners at least to justify and at best to glorify the ac-
tions of their forebears and the need of both North and South to re-
constitute themselves as a united state.  In telling the story of the sig-
nificance within the Nation’s collective memory of the war and its 
aftermath, David Blight reminds us that the twin ends of Reconstruc-
tion were fundamentally at odds: “Americans faced an overwhelming 
 105. While jurisgenerative law arises from communities supplying legal meaning 
through distinctive cultural norms, jurispathic law “imposes a hierarchy” on diverse inter-
pretations of the law.  See Cover, supra note 88, at 40.  
 106. The Brian Lehrer Show: The Memory Industry (WNYC radio broadcast May 5, 2011), 
available at http://www.wnyc.org/people/kanan-makiya/. 
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task after the Civil War and emancipation: how to understand the 
tangled relationship between two profound ideas—healing and jus-
tice.”107
The blood was barely dry at Appomattox when the central 
themes of the Lost Cause movement began to take hold in the South.  
In its first postbellum editorial after reopening in December 1865, the 
Richmond Dispatch maintained that the war was fought over states’ 
rights; that Confederate soldiers had fought with “courage and con-
stancy;” and that the Grays’ fate was sealed by “superior numbers and 
resources.”
  Healing seemed to require acts and omissions of memory that 
justice did not permit. 
108  The editorial did not mention slavery or emancipa-
tion.109  Deep into the last century, the Lost Cause movement told the 
dominant story of the Civil War in the South: slavery was not the cause 
of the war; most slaves had a benevolent relationship with their mas-
ters; Robert E. Lee was a gentlemanly, near saintly hero; and the fail-
ure of Reconstruction owed to corrupt northern “carpetbaggers” who 
imposed graft and subjugation, preventing the civil South from 
achieving reconciliation in its own way.110
The United Confederate Veterans and the United Daughters of 
the Confederacy (“UDC”) formed history committees devoted to re-
butting alleged biases of northern historians’ telling of the war and 
Reconstruction.
  
111  The leaders of the UDC gave speeches, wrote edi-
torials, and endorsed southern-friendly schoolbooks (while condemn-
ing all others), leading Blight to conclude that “[o]n a popular level 
[the UDC] may have accomplished more than professional historians 
in laying down for decades (within families and schools) a conception 
of a victimized South, fighting nobly for high Constitutional prin-
ciples, and defending a civilization of benevolent white masters and 
contented African slaves.”112  United Daughters of the Confederacy-
approved histories emphasizing, among other things, that “Recon-
struction was the vicious oppression of an innocent South and the ex-
ploitation of ignorant blacks,” became the received common wisdom 
in the South, eventually promoted not just by explicitly partisan or-
ganizations but by state departments of education.113
 
 107. DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY 3 
(2001). 
 
 108. Id. at 37–38. 
 109. Id. at 38. 
 110. See Ken I. Kersch, Beyond Originalism: Conservative Declarationism and Constitutional 
Redemption, 71 MD. L. REV. 229, 260–67 (2011). 
 111. BLIGHT, supra note 107, at 277. 
 112. Id. at 278, 282. 
 113. Id. at 282–83. 
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The continuing influence of this intellectual history is reflected 
in recent controversies over the commemoration of Confederate His-
tory Month.  From 1995 to 1997, Virginia Governor George Allen is-
sued a proclamation in connection with the commemoration in which 
he referred to the Civil War as “a four-year struggle for independence 
and sovereign rights;” to “the honorable sacrifices of [Virginia’s] 
leaders, soldiers and citizens to the cause of liberty[;]” and to the sol-
diers who were “overwhelmed by insurmountable numbers and re-
sources of their determined opponents, . . . [who] returned to their 
homes and families to rebuild their communities in peace . . . .”114  
The proclamation did not mention race or slavery, nor (needless to 
say) did it refer to Black Codes or the Ku Klux Klan, which was 
founded by Confederate veterans at the start of Reconstruction.  Al-
len’s successor, Jim Gilmore, responding to criticisms of Allen’s proc-
lamation, issued a less hagiographic proclamation for a “Month for 
Remembrance of the Sacrifices and Honor of All Virginians Who 
Served in the Civil War,” in which slavery was explicitly cited as a but-
for cause of the war.115  In response, the Virginia chapter of the Sons 
of Confederate Veterans issued a competing proclamation defending 
Virginia’s participation in the war; referring to federal troops as “an 
invading army”; referring to Richmond as “the wartime home of our 
beloved President Jefferson Davis”; and rededicating itself to 
“teach[ing] the true history of the South to future generations.”116  
Two successive Democratic administrations refused to issue any proc-
lamations, but Republican Governor Bob McDonnell revived the 
practice in 2010, issuing a proclamation that, like Allen’s, made no 
mention of slavery.117
The footprint of the Lost Cause version of the war and Recon-
struction was not limited to the South.  Amid the cottage industry in 
Civil War reenactments and histories, it is easy to overlook the ab-
sence of similar recognition of Reconstruction.  Reconstruction en-
tailed military occupation of the South, coerced political communion 
between former masters and former slaves, and the enactment, under 
 
 
 114. Katherine D. Walker, United, Regardless, and a Bit Regretful: Confederate History Month, 
the Slavery Apology, and the Failure of Commemoration, 9 AM. NINETEENTH CENTURY HIST. 315, 
315–16 (2008). 
 115. Id. at 323–24. 
 116. Id. at 326–27. 
 117. In response to the controversy, McDonnell later revised the proclamation to in-
clude a discussion of slavery.  He initially defended his omission by saying that he had “fo-
cused on the [issues he] thought were most significant for Virginia.”  Anita Kumar & Rosa-
lind S. Helderman, McDonnell Revives Storm Over Va.’s Confederate Past, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 
2010, at A1. 
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duress, of a fundamental reordering of the Constitution.  Blight writes 
that “[d]uring Reconstruction, many Americans increasingly realized 
that remembering the war . . . became, with time, easier than strug-
gling over the enduring ideas for which [its] battles had been 
fought.”118
How wholesome and healing the peace has been!  We have 
found one another again as brothers and comrades, in arms, 
enemies no longer, generous friends rather, our battles long 
past, the quarrel forgotten—except that we shall not forget 
the splendid valor, the manly devotion of the men then ar-
rayed against one another, now grasping hands and smiling 
into each other’s eyes.  How complete the union has become 
and how dear to all of us, how unquestioned, how benign 
and majestic, as state after state has been added to this, our 
great family of free men!
  At a ceremony commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of 
the Battle of Gettysburg, President Woodrow Wilson, flanked by a U.S. 
flag to his right and a Confederate flag to his left, delivered the fol-
lowing address: 
119
The demands of national reconciliation required, at the expense of 
justice, a retelling of Reconstruction that regarded its costly and failed 
effort to achieve substantive emancipation for millions of former 
slaves as an arrogant mistake. 
 
Through the middle of the twentieth century, the dominant 
narrative of Reconstruction was supplied by denizens of the Dunning 
School, after William Dunning, whose Reconstruction, Political and Eco-
nomic 1865-1877 tells a story of peace delayed by “radicals and carpet-
baggers.”120  We get a glimpse of the tenor of Dunning School Recon-
struction history in the writings of the influential historian and native 
Alabamian Walter Fleming.  On Fleming’s telling, the Black Codes in 
southern states and the federal government’s Freedmen’s Bureau 
represented two “proposed solutions” to “the same problem”121 of 
“guiding the freedmen into a place in the social order,”122 and the 
Black Codes “might have succeeded if it had been given a fair trial.”123
 
 118. BLIGHT, supra note 
  
The Bureau itself was largely populated by “men of inferior ability and 
character, either blind partisans of the negro or corrupt and subject 
107, at 31. 
 119. Id. at 10–11. 
 120. WILLIAM A. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 1865–1877, at 
341 (1907). 
 121. WALTER LYNWOOD FLEMING, THE SEQUEL OF APPOMATTOX 89 (1919). 
 122. Id. at 115. 
 123. Id. 
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to purchase by the whites.”124  Fleming was deeply dismissive of the 
radical Republican leadership in Congress.  Thaddeus Stevens was 
“vindictive and unscrupulous;”125 Charles Sumner “unpractical, theo-
retical, and not troubled by constitutional scruples”;126 Senators Oliv-
er P. Morton of Indiana and Benjamin Wade of Ohio “bluff, coarse, 
and ungenerous”; Senator George Boutwell of Massachusetts “fanati-
cal and mediocre”; and Massachusetts Congressman Benjamin Butler 
“a charlatan and demagogue.”127  The Joint Committee on Recon-
struction, which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, made “[n]o se-
rious effort . . . to ascertain the actual conditions in the South.”128  
Due in large part to failures of character among Republicans, 
“[s]carcely a measure of Congress during reconstruction was designed 
or received in a conciliatory spirit.”129
Fleming says that Reconstruction wreaked havoc on the South, 
especially in states with large black populations; these states felt the 
brunt of the failed policies because occupation meant their govern-
ments were controlled by “ignorant” and “corrupt” carpetbaggers and 
scalawags who retained power solely due to black enfranchisement 
and “could secure no support from the respectable elements of the 
electorate.”
  
130  Conditions for emancipated blacks in these and other 
southern states declined because “[t]he serious matter of looking out 
for himself and his family and of making a living dampened the ne-
gro’s cheerful spirits.”131
The Ku Klux movement . . . grew out of a general conviction 
among the whites that the reconstruction policies were im-
possible and not to be endured. . . .  The people of the 
South were by law helpless to take steps towards setting up 
any kind of government in a land infested by a vicious ele-
ment—Federal and Confederate deserters, bushwhackers, 
outlaws of every description, and negroes, some of whom 
proved insolent and violent in their newly found freedom.
  Ignorant, dispossessed, and vindictive, many 
blacks were led to violence, Fleming writes, leading whites with little 
choice but to found Ku Klux Klan orders.  Fleming adds: 
132
 
 124. Id. at 99. 
 
 125. Id. at 122. 
 126. Id. at 123. 
 127. Id. at 125. 
 128. Id. at 126. 
 129. Id. at 280. 
 130. Id. at 220–21. 
 131. Id. at 274. 
 132. Id. at 243–44. 
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Fleming writes that the Klan was simply a “primitive method[] of 
justice,”133 motivated by “[t]he lawlessness of the negroes . . . and the 
disturbing influences of the black troops, of some officials of the 
[Freedmen’s] Bureau, and of some of the missionary teachers and 
preachers, [who] caused the whites to fear insurrections and to take 
measures for protection.”134  W.E.B. DuBois, who was hardly afraid to 
throw a punch, criticized Fleming, but said that, in comparison to 
other prominent historians of Reconstruction, his works “have a cer-
tain fairness and sense of historic honesty.”135
According to Eric Foner, the Dunning School retained its hold 
on “the popular imagination” until the 1960s.
  
136  We see its finger-
prints in simplistic portrayals of blacks (in blackface) and the heroic 
cast of the Klan in The Birth of a Nation.137  We see its legacy in Marga-
ret Mitchell’s depictions of blacks during Reconstruction as unbridled 
and apelike, and her description of the Klan as a “tragic necessity” in 
Gone With the Wind.138  We see it in the robes of the Statue of Liberty, 
which obscure the broken shackles around Lady Liberty’s feet, a tri-
bute to black emancipation deliberately hidden from view so as not to 
offend southerners.139
The memory of slavery, emancipation, and the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments never fit well into a developing 
narrative in which the Old and New South were romanti-
cized and welcomed back to a new nationalism, and in which 
devotion alone made everyone right, and no one truly 
wrong, in the remembered Civil War.
  As Blight writes:  
140
The Fourteenth Amendment is a central player in a drama the 
Nation has chosen to forget.  This status cripples the Amendment’s 
 
 
 133. Id. at 264. 
 134. Id. at 48.  Woodrow Wilson offers a similar explanation for the rise of the Ku Klux 
Klan in V WOODROW WILSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 58 (1931) (“The white 
men of the South were aroused by the mere instinct of self-preservation to rid themselves, 
by fair means or foul, of the intolerable burdens of governments sustained by the votes of 
ignorant negroes . . . . ”). 
 135. W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860–1880, at 720 (1935). 
 136. FONER, supra note 82, at xix–xx. 
 137. THE BIRTH OF A NATION (D.W. Griffith Corp. 1915). 
 138. MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND 914 (1936) (“Here was the astonish-
ing spectacle of half a nation attempting, at the point of a bayonet, to force upon the oth-
er half the rule of negroes, many of them scarcely one generation out of the African jun-
gles.”). 
 139. See Making the Case for the African-American Origins of the Statue of Liberty, 27 J. BLACKS 
IN HIGHER EDUC. 65, 66 (2000) (noting that early models of the statue featured shackles 
on Lady Liberty’s left hand, which were later removed). 
 140. BLIGHT, supra note 107, at 4. 
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capacity to do the work asked of originalist history.  Largely absent 
from or rendered in diminished form within the narratives we have 
long told about our national identity, the Fourteenth Amendment 
cannot derive authority from any status as a shared point of reference.  
We do not regard its moment of creation as ethically unambiguous, 
and so it is disabled in resolving the ethical ambiguity that is the stuff 
of hard cases.  Indeed, to the extent that the Fourteenth Amendment 
is viewed differently in the North and in the South, its expressive ten-
dency is to reinforce rather than resolve cultural division.141  In diag-
nosing the absence of originalist arguments in affirmative action cas-
es, for example, we might note that originalists often oppose 
affirmative action as a policy matter, but a more complete story would 
recall that the Freedmen’s Bureau—the prime exemplar of race-
conscious governmental action during Reconstruction—was despised 
in the South.142
III.   
  For southerners and for those educated within the 
Lost Cause tradition, the Bureau evokes illegality.  Likewise, the Four-
teenth Amendment itself, forced down the throat of the southern po-
litical establishment, is neither a moment of pride nor of identity-
formation for subsequent generations of white southerners.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment is unlikely to resonate with many such 
people, and they are unlikely to claim it, or even to recognize it, as 
ethical authority. 
There are many varieties of originalism in the legal academy, and 
not all treat the Fourteenth Amendment with disproportionate neg-
lect.  The theoretical integrity reflected in some of those varieties is 
symptomatic, however, of the missing elements in their projects—the 
authoritarianism and narrative force that has enabled originalism to 
narrow the divide between professional and public constitutional dis-
course.  Self-described originalists who give appropriate regard to the 
redemptive potential of the Fourteenth Amendment are not wrong as 
to hermeneutics, and they are often persuasive as to the best under-
standing of Fourteenth Amendment principles.  Where they fail, and 
where I fear they must fail, is in articulating a basis for Fourteenth 
 
 141. Cf. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural 
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1320 (2003) (“[W]hat individuals 
accept as truth cannot be divorced from the values and practices that define their cultural 
identities.”). 
 142. FLEMING, supra note 121, at 89.  Mississippi Governor Benjamin Humphreys called 
the Freedmen’s Bureau “a hideous curse.”  Id. at 90. 
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Amendment authority that is capable of bridging the gap between 
originalists and nonoriginalists. 
It is fitting to begin with Balkin, as his provocative work inspires 
this Essay and the Symposium of which it is part.  Balkin has proposed 
what he calls “framework originalism,”143 under which modern inter-
preters are bound to the semantic meanings of the Constitution’s text 
and to the Constitution’s choice of rules, standards, and principles, 
but are not bound by the original intentions or original expected ap-
plications of its drafters or ratifiers.144  According to Balkin, frame-
work originalism fully embraces both originalism and living constitu-
tionalism because “[f]idelity to original semantic meaning is 
consistent with a wide range of possible future constitutional con-
structions that implement the original meaning and that add new in-
stitutional structures and political practices that do not conflict with 
it.”145  Framework originalism “allows individuals in every generation 
to invoke the Constitution’s text and principles and call upon the 
American people to restore and redeem the Constitution.”146
Balkin is dealing in semantics.  He implicitly concedes that most 
originalists are not framework originalists
  For 
Balkin, originalism is in effect the practice of constitutional fidelity, 
and so rightly exercised, originalism serves both redemptive and res-
torative narratives. 
147 and he explicitly states 
that “[m]ost living constitutionalists are framework originalists, even if 
they do not realize it.”148
 
 143. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 
  This is no less than an admission from Bal-
kin that he is speaking Esperanto while the rest of us are speaking 
English.  That is not to say that Balkin does not offer valuable insights 
that undermine many of the basic theoretical assumptions of both 
originalists and living constitutionalists—perhaps we should all speak 
Esperanto—but it does mean that his message is likely to be lost in 
translation.  The dichotomy between living constitutionalists and ori-
ginalists is a fact about the world that cannot be understood in isola-
tion from other ways in which people divide themselves ideologically 
and culturally.  I do not take Balkin’s intervention necessarily to con-
flict with the point that the choice between living constitutionalism 
and originalism as it exists in the (English-speaking) world reflects di-
vergent understandings of American identity, and that constitutional 
87, at 228. 
 144. Id. at 228–29. 
 145. Id. at 231–32. 
 146. Id. at 235. 
 147. Id. at 230–31. 
 148. Id. at 234. 
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method can serve as a language through which those understandings 
are coded into legal argument. 
Akhil Amar is only occasionally described as an originalist, and 
that is so in large measure because his work is not susceptible to the 
charges described in this Essay.  Indeed, his most celebrated work, The 
Bill of Rights, is precisely a call for modern Americans to understand 
the ways in which the first ten amendments must be understood 
through the lens of the Civil War and Reconstruction.  The book is 
best known for its articulation of Amar’s theory of “refined incorpora-
tion,” under which the fact of incorporation is determined by the ex-
tent to which a right may be conceived in terms of the privileges or 
immunities of citizenship.149  It has been less appreciated that the 
book also means to advocate that the meaning and scope of an incor-
porated right be understood with reference to the concerns that ani-
mated the Reconstruction generation.  Amar suggests, for example, 
that “the very meaning of freedom of speech, press, petition, and as-
sembly was subtly redefined in the process of being incorporated,” so 
that the paradigm case shifted from people like John Peter Zenger to 
people like Harriet Beecher Stowe (or, he might have said, Hinton 
Helper).150
Amar has gone further, though, to suggest that modern doctrine 
implicitly recognizes the subtle transformative work performed by in-
corporation even as the rhetoric of such doctrine cites the eighteenth-
century Framers.  Thus, the significance of the abolitionist cause to 
Reconstruction understandings of free speech argues for a greater 
role for federal judges relative to juries in protecting First Amend-
ment rights, and modern doctrine has evolved in this direction.
  
151
Amar is often described as a structuralist or a textualist rather 
than as an originalist, and Amar has not otherwise promoted himself.  
  To 
the extent Amar is correct, his observations provide even greater sup-
port for the incongruity of originalist neglect of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  For to the extent that he is correct, originalists inter-
preting incorporated rights not only work with a text crafted during 
Reconstruction but they often advance “originalist” claims that, in fact 
but not in rhetoric, are deeply affected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
 
 149. AMAR, supra note 15, at 221. 
 150. Id. at 236. 
 151. Id. at 242.  Amar notes, for example, that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964), relies on the (judge-empowering) Sedition Act as its paradigm negative 
precedent even as it announces a rule of decision—in a civil rights case, no less—that em-
powers judges rather than juries.  Id. at 243. 
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It should be clear that this labeling impulse is itself a symptom of the 
problem this Essay identifies: those who take the Fourteenth Amend-
ment seriously, and who (as a consequence) disclaim the kind of 
clause-bound interpretation described in Part I, are not coded as ac-
tual originalists.  It is worthwhile, however, to consider two additional 
examples of conservative originalist scholars who in recent years have 
engaged in inquiries that do not fit neatly into the patterns this Essay 
has described: Kurt Lash and Randy Barnett. Lash has devoted consi-
derable attention to the drafting history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,152 and in a series of articles in the 1990s he sought expressly to 
demonstrate that the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause were understood quite differently by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment ratifying generation than by the eighteenth-century ratifiers.153  
More recently, he has emphasized that when we discuss “incorpo-
rated” rights, “what we are after is not the incorporation of 1787 texts, 
but the public understanding of 1868 texts—in particular the mean-
ing of Privileges or Immunities and the scope of congressional power 
to enforce these newly constitutionalized rights.”154
Barnett, who has been in the vanguard of so-called “new” origi-
nalists, has only recently begun to devote attention to Fourteenth 
Amendment interpretation.  In an article published in 2011, Barnett 
canvassed abolitionist writings for evidence of the origins of Section 1 
of the Amendment.
 
155  He did so, however, not in the service of the 
view that many significant constitutional rights casually grounded in 
the Founding must instead (or in addition) be viewed in light of the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather to dem-
onstrate that sophisticated antislavery constitutional arguments were 
advanced by nineteenth century abolitionists.156
 
 152. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John 
Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329 (2011); Kurt T. 
Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and Immunities” as an 
Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010). 
  Barnett’s recent 
work is therefore consistent with my earlier insinuation that originalist 
attention to the Fourteenth Amendment is a matter of self-
preservation: it aids the originalist cause to demonstrate that anti-
 153. See Lash, Free Exercise, supra note 6; Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6.  Specifi-
cally, according to Lash, the Reconstruction-era ratifiers believed that the Free Exercise 
Clause required accommodations from neutral laws of general applicability and that the 
Establishment Clause came to be viewed in individual rights terms, and not merely as a 
federalism provision. 
 154. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, supra note 6, at 449. 
 155. Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 3 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 165 (2011). 
 156. Id. at 173–74.  
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Garrisonian arguments against a pro-slavery Constitution were well-
grounded.157
Still, Barnett’s shift in focus may be viewed more charitably as a 
recognition of his own previously stated view that “[d]iscerning and 
applying the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a 
tricky business.”
   
158
I do not doubt the sincerity of either Barnett or Lash (nor, in-
deed, of Justice Scalia), and it is possible that their work is in the van-
guard of a “new, new originalism” that takes the Fourteenth Amend-
ment much more seriously.  It is indeed in the interest of new 
originalists, many of whom have a libertarian bent, to revitalize the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a significant site for anti-state arguments, 
particularly in the economic realm.
  His recent work may be but a preliminary and in-
cremental step towards a bolder set of arguments.   
159  If this Essay’s claims are cor-
rect, however, any scholar’s success at advancing a new version of ori-
ginalism along these lines is likely thereby to render her framework 
less identifiably originalist.  The best either Lash or Balkin can expect 
is that current originalists will concede the label but find another 
more compelling means of self-identification that better resonates 
with their ethical values.160
 
 157. See supra note 100. 
  Those whose interests tend toward the ac-
tual rather than merely the theoretical divides in constitutional argu-
ment will then, I predict, lose interest in writing about “originalism.” 
 158. Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMM. 405, 411 (2007). 
 159. Indeed, the fact that younger originalists tend to adopt a different posture toward 
the Fourteenth Amendment might reflect important generational shifts in the politics of 
opposition that characterize originalism.  See Bobbitt, supra note 70, at 24 (arguing that 
historical arguments are often “better for dissent than for the Court”).  Older originalists, 
educated by Fairman and his contemporaries, accepted the New Deal settlement but re-
jected Warren Court liberalism, which is typified by a generous attitude toward incorpora-
tion.  By contrast, many modern originalists accept much of the Warren Court’s corpus 
but are comfortable revisiting the New Deal settlement, which tended to rein in the Four-
teenth Amendment’s jurisgenerative capacity.  I thank Jack Balkin for suggesting this 
point. 
 160. There is evidence that something like this has already happened.  Thomas Colby 
has argued that originalism has become intellectually respectable among academics only at 
the expense of the claims to judicial restraint that make it respectable among members of 
the public.  See generally Colby, supra note 78.  Divorcing original meaning from the origi-
nal intent of the drafters, which is the major innovation of “new originalism,” made some 
theoretical and strategic sense but it made constitutional interpretation far more open-
ended.  It also separated originalism from the authority of the individuals most directly 
responsible for the American Revolution and the original Constitution.  A quarter century 
after this innovation was announced by Justice Scalia, it remains rare for members of the 
public to substitute original meaning for original intent. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
In one of the 2012 Republican presidential primary debates, the 
audience at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, 
California, cheered when questioner Brian Williams noted to Rick 
Perry that he had overseen 234 executions as Texas governor.161  The 
crowd reaction was much criticized, but it broadly reflects a cultural 
divide that exaggerates policy differences.  Even as strong majorities 
support both capital punishment162 and high standards of review for 
capital cases, a hierarchical, law-and-order orientation is, as Balkin 
would say, “nested in opposition”163
There may likewise be only marginal “policy” differences between 
the hermeneutic practices of originalism and living constitutionalism.  
But originalism does much more than assist in textual analysis; it, too, 
announces a cultural affinity.  Those sharing that affinity are suspi-
cious rather than solicitous of Reconstruction and the work of the Re-
construction-era Republicans.  For Justice Thomas’s opinion in Baze 
to have addressed that era rather than the Founding would have sacri-
ficed a significant measure of authority for his opinion.  It also would 
have denied him the chance to give that era’s approach to law and 
order a resounding cheer. 
 to an egalitarian, rights-focused 
orientation.  Cheering executions does not so much engage a policy 
debate as announce a cultural affinity. 
 
 161. 2012 Republican Presidential Debate (NBC television broadcast Sept. 7, 2011). 
 162. Are You in Favor of the Death Penalty for a Person Convicted of Murder? 1936–2011 Trend, 
GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx. 
 163. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
